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Abstract 
Given the rapid advances in assisted reproductive technology, the need for providing 
a more nuanced insight into the understanding of the concept biological parenthood 
becomes all the more evident. With the aim of providing nuance and balance to the 
extant literature regarding the concept of biological parenthood, this paper attempts to 
show that a) the desire for biological parenthood bears a deeper meaning than a 
prejudice-based legitimate will, and b) this assumption does not necessarily reflect a 
sharp distinction between biological and social parenthood, which may profoundly 
affect negatively intimate bonds between family members. The paper is articulated in 
three steps. In a first step, this paper attempts to identify a number of arguments that 
might count as good evidence to emphasize the role of biological relatedness between 
parent and offspring in the context of modern techno-science, social reality and 
theoretical thinking. In a second step, it defends the assumption that people are 
strongly motivated to desire genetic relatedness with as high as possible relatedness 
coefficient.  Further, in a third step, this study moves forward on a novel (individual) 
account of parenthood that is a biological/social hybrid in the case where (social) 
parenthood starts during early neonatal period. This interim account of parenthood 
(between biological and social parenthood) comes from the heart and the parent-
newborn attachment. Social parenthood would be considered not purely social when 
starting at the very beginning of child’s life. This borderline account of parenthood 
might smooth out the categorical distinction between biological and social 
parenthood.  
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Abbreviations 
IVG = In-vitro generated gametes. 
IVF = In-vitro fertilization 
ROPA = Reception of oocytes from the partner. 
SOR = Symbol of one’s relationship. 
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Introduction 
The great advances in IVF (in-vitro 
fertilization)-technologies that can 
afford new types of both biological and 
social parenthood options do cast 
doubt on both the intrinsic value of 
biological ties between parents and 
children. The recurrent debate over 
anonymity in IVF is an indication of it.  
Many scholars do not share the 
intrinsic value of the biological 
relatedness of offspring. Di Nucci 
(2016) in his publication in the Journal 
of Medical Ethics rejects the intrinsic 
value of biological relatedness and 
argues that the wanting to have 
biological children bears no “deeper 
meaning” than a “legitimate wish-but 
only in terms of individual liberty” that 
is based on “irrational prejudice”. In 
the same line of thought Sparrow 
argues that genetic relatedness does not 
suffice to establish parental 
relationship or to negatively affect 
family relations. In the same vein, 
Rulli defends a pro tanto duty of 
prospective parents to adopt rather than 
to procreate.   
Besides, modern IVF technologies 
have result in the traditional account of 
parenthood being greatly criticized. 
New accounts of parenthood have been 
emerged (biological, intentional, 
causal, custodial etc). Bayane and 
Kolers (2003) interestingly offer a 
“pluralist sufficiency” (Zeiler and 
Malmquist, 2014)  account of 
parenthood based on the causal 
involving in creating (“existence and 
survival”) of the child through either 
genetic or gestational relationship or 
even intention.  Parenthood may arise 
from whatever of these relations. The 
traditional account of biological 
parenthood has already been split into 
three (at present) accounts (genetic, 
gestational and mitochondrial) or much 
more if there will be the possibility of 
creating in-vitro artificial gametes.     
On the contrary, other views confine 
their focus to human biology (alone or 
in combination with social 
environment). Balayla rejects the view 
that infertility is harmful because it 
represents a failure to meet social 
standards as “inaccurate and 
misleading” (Balayla 2016). The 
author focuses on human biology and 
speaks about “…biological imperative, 
defined as the innate drive of living 
organisms to perpetuate their 
existence”, that “is largely 
evolutionary in nature and predates 
modern cultural norms” (Balayla 
2016). Wilkinson and Williams 
concede that the effects of infertility 
are made worse by the social context.  
Social sexism, essentialism and other 
collective norms are considered to be 
among the social factors that increase 
the value of the biological ties between 
parents and children (Wilkinson and 
Williams 2016). However, they hold 
that infertility "does involve the 
subnormal functioning (or absence) of 
a bodily part or process and does 
deprive women of the option to 
become pregnant, and this would be so 
even in a utopia without sexist and 
pronatalist attitudes" (Wilkinson and 
Williams, 2016: p. 562). Dondorp and 
De Wert (2009) stand by the 
compromising opinion that the direct 
genetic derivation is both 
“biologically” and “culturally” “deeply 
rooted” desire. These assumptions, 
although reasonable, lack supporting 
evidence.  
In this paper, an attempt is made to 
provide some contribution to the 
current debate. The aim of the present 
study is three-fold and proceeds as 
follows. In a first step, it attempts to 
identify a number of arguments that 
might count as good evidence to   
underscore the biological relatedness 
of offspring in the contemporary 
context of techno-scientific progress, 
social transformation and theoretical 
Aristotle Biomedical Journal, Vol 2, No 2 e-ISSN: 2653-9748 
 
87 
 
thinking. In a second step, using 
phenomenology, it attempts to provide 
a novel reason as to why human-beings 
are strongly (intrinsically) motivated to 
have genetic relatives with as much as 
possible high relatedness coefficient. 
In a third step, a novel account of 
parenthood is provided as a borderline 
biological/social hybrid in the case 
where (social) parenthood starts during 
early neonatal period.  
 
Reinforcing the biological 
parenthood 
Below is presented a number of 
arguments raised in the context of 
biotechnology advances and social 
transformations that might count as 
good evidence to underscore the 
biological relatedness of offspring. 
 
Is biological parenthood a strong 
desire? 
Biological parenthood seems 
empirically to be a strong desire. Many 
people worldwide make the choice to 
bear the costs and especially the risks 
of undergoing methods of medically 
assisted reproduction aiming at 
realizing biological parenthood instead 
of considering the alternative of 
adoption. In the case of male infertility 
the more costly intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection (ICSI) method seems to be 
preferable to the less costly and risky 
method of heterologous insemination 
(Dondorp and De Wert 2009). 
According to a research regarding the 
countries of EU around 50% of 
Europeans was reported to desire the 
model of the “two-child family” 
(Tanturri et al. 2015). In this study, the 
increase in voluntary childlessness was 
considered “modest” (as it remains at 
below 10%), given that our Western-
type society where we live in is no 
more strongly pronatalist. Indeed, 
young Europeans are given a big 
number of lifestyle options and the 
traditional nuclear heterosexual family 
is nowadays changing.  
 
Infertility as illness 
Infertility has been considered by a 
number of scholars as unhealthy state 
(Domar et al. 1993; Kraaij 2009). 
Besides, reproductive health is 
considered as one of the human 
capabilities that according to 
Nussbaum are essential to leading a 
“minimally decent life” (Nussbaum 
1999). A study regarding Australia 
suggests that childless women 
experience poorer physical and mental 
health and well-being during the peak 
reproductive years (Graham 2015). 
However, infertility has also been 
considered a   purely social problem, 
namely, a socially determined 
“abnormality” (Pemberton 2011). At 
any rate, the assumption that 
involuntary childlessness may 
profoundly affect negatively an 
individual’s well-being has been 
entrenched in (a part of) society in the 
sense that generations of discussions 
have been made on this basis around 
the world during the period of human 
history. This is likely to reflect that 
infertility bears a deeper meaning than 
a socially determined abnormality.  
 
Modern IVF techniques and genetic 
relatedness 
Zeiler and Malmquist (2014) arguably 
notice that IVF technologies both 
promote (IVF without a donor) and 
undermine (gamete donation, 
surrogacy, ROPA) the valuating of 
biological ties between parents and 
children, which however depends on 
socio-political environment in which 
IVF technologies are being developed. 
They are partly right. IVF technologies 
“undermine” the biological relatedness 
of offspring as they promote social 
parenthood. Nevertheless, methods as 
gamete donation, surrogacy or ROPA 
primarily aim at promoting the 
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biological relatedness of offspring. In 
the instance that one individual 
becomes biological parent it is likely 
that his or her partner becomes social 
parent as being involved in offspring’s 
parenting. Modern IVF techniques 
provide strong evidence to underscore 
genetic relatedness. Carroll  and 
Kroløkke  (2017) argue that from their 
study it emerged that social egg 
freezing “reinforces the genetic 
relatedness of offspring.”  Cutas et al. 
(2014) explored how researchers 
involved in work with artificial 
gametes (that are a new class of 
“unnatural” entity, Smajdor 2005), 
ethicists, and representatives of 
potential user groups envisioned the 
use of artificial gametes in human 
reproduction. They found that 
recurring theme was “the strength of 
the claim of becoming a parent 
genetically”.  
 
The desire of homosexuals to achieve 
biological parenthood  
Murphy (2013) explored how gay men 
living in the United States and 
Australia understand their desire to 
have children. He found that although 
the majority of participants “accepted 
the notion that homosexuality was 
synonymous with childlessness”, they 
“played with the symbols of kinship to 
negotiate and obscure biogenetic 
paternity.” 
Lesbian couples can achieve “sharing 
biological motherhood” through the 
so-called ROPA, namely, reception of 
oocytes from the partner, using the 
uterus of one partner while the other 
gives her oocytes) (Zeiler and 
Malmquist 2014; Di Nucci 2016). At 
first blush, desire for ROPA means 
desire for biological parenthood. 
However, scholars have cast doubt on 
this assumption.  Di Nucci (2016) in 
order to support his arguments against 
the intrinsic value of biological 
relatedness offers a spectrum of 
circumstances and motivations that 
might count as reasons (medical or 
non-medical) why lesbian couples 
decide to move to IVF-with ROPA. 
Indeed, such reasons cannot be out of 
the question. However, it is most likely 
that   lesbian couples seeking ROPA 
attach great instrumental value to 
biological relatedness considering it as 
means to achieve the (perhaps life) 
goal of having a child that “truly came 
from both of them” (BBC News, 2005) 
and be something of “two of them” 
(Provoost et al. 2012). Given the truth 
of the suggestion that a high rate of 
heterosexual couples attribute high 
symbolic (of their relationship) 
meaning to their biological offspring, 
such a rate might be much higher 
among same-sex couples that are 
normally expected to need to further 
strengthen their bond in order to copy 
with heteronormative social pressures. 
From a recently published qualitative 
survey conducted by Somers et al. 
(2017)  emerged that lesbian couples 
who want to achieve parenthood 
through donor insemination (DI) want 
to adapt their decisions to 
heteronormativity and the value of 
genetic ties between parents and 
children in their social context. Indeed, 
heteronormativity is strictly linked 
with what Haslanger (2009) calls 
“bionormativity”. Both are based on 
essentialism and predominate in our 
society. As Somers et al. (2017) state, 
while the predominant perception that 
emerged from the survey was that 
parenthood may be achieved without 
genetic relatedness, from the survey 
also emerged substantial indications 
supporting the wish of most 
participants to fit into 
heteronormativity and accept the value 
of biological relatedness.  However, a 
closer examination of the survey 
findings might reveal that this was a 
wish not purely motivated by their 
external environment. It was seemed to 
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be originated from their internal 
context as it is stated by the authors 
that going through treatment together 
and the choice for an anonymous 
sperm donor were sometimes seen as 
efforts to fortify the weak position of 
the partner who was non-genetic parent 
(Somers et al. 2017). Besides, “the 
biological mother was often more 
entitled to being celebrated on 
Mother’s Day” (Somers et al. 2017). 
Given the truth of the assumption that 
“lesbian couples weave together old 
and new understandings of relatedness 
in complex patterns” (Nordqvist 2012), 
it should be explored whether lesbian 
parents bring into their parental role 
the traditional values they acquired 
during their upbringing. Pelka (2009) 
argues that ROPA results in reducing 
the feelings of jealousy between 
lesbian couple partners as it affects the 
emotional dynamics and promotes the 
perception of equal ties between 
mothers and children. Such relational 
inequalities might be based on 
considerable value that one or both the 
partners attribute to biological ties, 
rather than induced by pronatalist 
social pressure that has already been 
weakened in our Western-type cultural 
reality.  In spite of the mentioned in 
literature trend of lesbians towards 
combining detachment from and 
adaption to heteronormativity-related 
norms for what concerns parenting, 
their sexual orientation-related 
predominant ideology represents a 
rejection of such norms. At any rate, as 
Zeiler and Malmquist (2014) state 
(providing a literature citation) “…the 
dream of having a child interacts with 
self-understanding, with norms of 
motherhood and fatherhood, and with 
the value attributed to genes and 
gestation in parenthood”. Besides, 
lesbians’ desire to undergo ROPA 
seems to be a strong desire. Pennings 
(2016) arguably states that the 
psychological benefits from ROPA for 
the partners of a lesbian couple 
outweigh the risks that it poses for 
them.   
 
Biological parenthood and 
naturalness 
 The vague and volatile moral criterion 
of “naturalness” may give rise to 
essentialist beliefs strongly related to 
prejudices. Such a belief may result in 
placing great weight on biological 
relatedness. However, naturalness as a 
moral criterion cannot be   rejected out 
of hand. Despite of a trend in modern 
bioethics toward rejecting naturalness, 
an intrinsic value is (rather intuitively) 
attributed to “naturalness” (Bayertz 
2005). What is considered natural is 
preferable to what is considered 
produced (Bayertz 2005; Birnbacher 
2006). This assumption seems to apply 
in the context of homosexual 
parenthood (where anti-essentialism 
would be expected to be the 
dominating ideology, Somers et al. 
2017; Nordqvist 2012; Folgerø 2008) 
as well as in the context of  distinction 
between genetic correction and genetic 
strictu sensu enhancement (Agar 2004; 
Agar 2010).  
A joint report published by the Human 
Genetics Advisory Committee and the 
HFEA states: “The wish for genetic 
offspring is a natural human 
aspiration...” (Smajdor 2005).  As 
regards the topic of reproduction, 
many bioethicists tend to show respect 
to naturalness regarding it as a deeply 
embedded assumption while, however, 
being skeptical about using the concept 
naturalness as a moral criterion (Cutas 
and Bortolotti 2010).  
 
The connectedness between parents 
and their biological embryos based 
on reason-bypassing processes 
From a qualitative study by Provoost et 
al. (2012) emerges that among the 
patients who had their embryos in 
storage, those (more than 50% of the 
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participants) viewing it as “symbol of 
one’s relationship” (SOR, meant to be 
a symbol as being embodiment of their 
“unique and highly appreciated” 
relationship), were found to place 
greater value on their genetic ties 
between themselves and their embryos. 
The participants with SOR view were 
found to make disposition-of-embryo 
decisions in a more emotionally loaded 
way. Although women with SOR were 
found to consider their embryos in 
storage to be of a higher moral status 
(a cognitive attitude), their embryo 
disposition decision-making process 
(moral judgment) was related to their 
emotional attitude towards their 
embryo. They rejected the option of 
donating their cryopreserved embryo 
to others for reproduction though that 
they considered it of high moral status 
and knew that such a choice would 
lead their embryo to destruction 
(Provoost et al. 2012). Some scholars, 
as Strong (2005) and Rai et al. (2007), 
share the viewpoint that having a 
biological offspring could strengthen 
the bond between the partners. 
 
Resemblances within biological 
families in support of biological 
relatedness 
The philosopher Velleman (2005) 
places considerable emphasis on “the 
resemblances that hold within 
biological families”. The author takes 
aim at children and argues that gaining 
knowledge by having acquaintance 
with their biological relatives is for 
them a “basic good” (necessary for 
achieving a “good life”) on which 
“most people rely in their pursuit of 
self-knowledge and identity formation”  
(Velleman 2005). The author points 
out that neither introspection nor 
watching in the mirror can drive one 
into the deeper aspects of oneself in 
order to achieve self-knowledge and 
form her identity. In order to achieve 
these goals one is necessary to 
appreciate their “intuitive and 
unanalyzable resemblance” to 
biological relatives and to be informed 
by narratives provided by their 
biological relatives (Velleman 2005). 
Haslanger (2009) states that identity 
formation is to some extent a matter of 
culture and biological family may be 
“basic good” (as major identity-
forming factor) only under the 
“dominant cultural schema” of the 
hetero-normative “natural nuclear 
family”. Haslanger criticises physical 
resemblance as a marker of biological 
relatedness, insofar as the 
resemblances we consider to be salient 
are informed by our presuppositions 
concerning a particular normative 
conception of family (Haslanger, 
2009). 
Di Nucci (2016) argues that family 
resemblances that are related to 
common upbringing (not to biological 
ties) are those to be taken to be 
identity-forming.  Whatever be the role 
of the context (cultural or familial) in 
relating identity formation to family 
resemblances, it would be a strong 
assumption that not everyone will 
share to make biological ties out of 
place. Such an assumption would be 
counterintuitive and pulled out of thin 
air, insofar the accurate role of genes 
(especially in their modern updated 
notion as I exhibit below) in family 
resemblances-forming remains 
unknown.  
An intuitive-based desire for 
acquaintance with genetic relatives 
seems to be a reasonable desire.  By 
and large, all people share common 
traits due to our common human 
nature. However, biological relatives 
are most likely to have in common a 
(more or less large) cluster of traits 
linked to their family uniqueness and 
due to their common ancestry. 
Provided the significant unclearness of 
the extension of the genes’ influence 
on every single trait along with the 
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common belief that genes play crucial 
role (as elsewhere here is presented), 
the acquaintance with one’s biological 
family may be perceived as potentially 
necessary (“basic good”, necessary for 
leading a “good life”) to complete 
one’s identity formation and  deeper 
self-knowledge.  
This consideration may be underscored 
by the Velleman’s (2005) strong 
claims that between biological 
relatives there is “intuitive and 
unanalyzable resemblance” on which, 
according to the philosopher, a deep 
human need places great value 
(Velleman 2008, p.259). Nevertheless, 
such a resemblance may be only 
presumed resemblance, as it may result 
from mechanisms as ex-post 
realization or over-generalization of 
hard-wired perceptions due to 
psychological genetic essentialism 
(based on biological determinism). In 
this respect, I share the Witt’s (2005) 
consideration that family resemblances 
are biological/social hybrids.  
 
The (probably significant) role of 
genes  
According to the available literature, 
whether genes play an essential role in 
formation of a considerable number of 
(more than negligible) traits of the 
child, thus profoundly motivating the 
desire to procreate, remains unclear. 
However, we should keep ourselves far 
from being as certain as those arguing 
against the intrinsic value of genetic 
relatedness. Chadwick (2012) argues 
that “there is a wide range of views 
about the importance of genes to 
personal identity”. According to the 
author, in light of any account of 
personal identity (physical, 
psychological or constructivist) genes 
can be taken to be playing a (more or 
less) important role in forming it   
(Chadwick 2012). At any rate, 
regardless of whether genes are 
regarded as the ‘essence’ of a person, 
most likely people’s self-perception 
seems to be influenced by genetic 
information to which they are seemed 
to attach great value. Growing 
understanding of epigenetics is 
expected to provide more insight into 
the sheer complexity of interaction 
between genome and environment. 
However, this may be proved to be an 
extremely difficult (if not unattainable) 
task. Interestingly, the modern updated 
notion of gene focuses upon the final 
(functional) products of a gene. It is 
stated that “a gene is a union of 
genomic sequences encoding a 
coherent set of potentially overlapping 
functional products” (Gerstein et al. 
2007). A complex operational unit 
seems to relate the genome sequences 
to functions and phenotypes (Gingeras 
2007). On this ground, it is argued that 
“we probably will not be able to ever 
know the function of all molecules in 
the genome” (Gerstein et al. 2007). In 
this prospective, the definition of genes 
needs some reconsideration, especially 
in terms of information, thus reigniting 
the assumption that they are 
determinist agents. Interestingly, 
Esposito (2017) in his interesting 
historical survey reasonably argues 
that the gene was always surrounded 
by what he calls the “rhetoric of 
futurity”, a promissory “discourse 
which includes expectations, promises 
and visions of the coming future”. The 
author argues that this rhetoric “has 
remained relatively consistent over 
time” and has renewed in the modern 
era of biotechnology by the fact that 
the gene has been made “a pragmatic 
tool oriented toward the future” 
(Esposito 2017).   Besides, it must not 
be overlooked that in the modern age 
of medical treatment, the branches of 
pharmacogenomics and personalized 
medicine place great weight on genes.   
For the   time being, in modern 
overmedicalized society, there is a 
growing trend towards over- than 
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undervaluing the role of genes. As to 
the account of parenthood, there is a 
deep conviction that direct genetic 
derivation is essential to parenthood. 
“Bionormativity” is a trait of our 
modern western society, as Haslanger 
(2009) states. It is quite unsurprising 
that courts have overturned adoptions 
on the ground that the father had not 
consented to it (Shanley  1993; 
Rosenman 1995). 
 
The importance of gestational 
(biological) motherhood 
Gestational motherhood is biological 
motherhood as involving considerable 
relatedness between the gestational 
mother and the child. From the 
moment of   attachment and 
implantation of the human embryo 
(which is human-being regardless of 
whether it is regarded as “person” or 
not) in uterus starts a continuum of 
dialectic between mother and embryo / 
fetus (Duwell 2003) that extents over 
the developmental procedure of an 
human embryo and exceeds it going 
beyond the birth, in neonatal phase or 
even much later. This dialectic is both 
biological and psychological. From a 
phenomenological perspective, as the 
embryo-fetus grows the pregnant sees 
her embryo as part of herself which is 
of high symbolic value. Hence, it 
assumes greater “internal visibility” 
(Svenaeus 2012), thus making stronger 
the mother’s perception that “another” 
human-being exists in her body. The 
high internal “visibility” of the 
embryo-fetus   facilitates the dialectic 
between gestational mother and it. This 
dialectic is involved in the process of 
defending their vulnerable corporeal 
integrity, thus causing the pregnant to 
perceive that shares with her embryo-
fetus the same “being-in-the-world”.  
Furthermore, as Park et al. (2015) 
argue, the “visually salient physical 
transformation” that   women undergo 
in the process of becoming mother is a 
factor that leads to heightened 
psychological essentialism. In light of 
this essentialism, motherhood is 
viewed in pregnancy-related biology 
fashion, escaping the attachment to 
genetic makeup (Park et al. 2015). The 
abovementioned psychological 
essentialism is in line with the so-
called “monistic” gestationalism 
(which is adopted by some 
jurisdictions) according to which 
parenthood (motherhood) is 
necessarily grounded in gestation 
(Bayane and Kolers 2003).  
 
An attempt to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of the desire for 
biological relatedness  
In literature there are a few reasons 
why one would desire to have genetic 
offspring. Rulli (2014) critically 
examines eight reasons for preferring a 
genetic child (i.e. physical/family 
resemblance, psychological similarity, 
symbol of parents’ love, a way to 
immortality, intrinsic value of genetic 
relatedness) and finally she defeats 
them with the possible exception of the 
pregnancy desire (based on the value 
attributed to pregnancy).   
In this paper, an attempt was made to 
support by way of phenomenology the 
assumption that people are strongly 
motivated to desire genetic relatedness 
with as high as possible relatedness 
coefficient. Therefore, the focus was 
shifted towards the concept of 
otherness, understood as “unhomelike 
being-in-the-world”, a term devised   
by Svenaeus (2011) to provide a 
phenomenological understanding of 
the essence of illness. In this respect, I 
consider that if people are intrinsically 
motivated to deter illness (holistically 
understood) meant as unhomelikeness, 
they are also intrinsically motivated to 
seek more and more homelike being-
in-the-world to improve their health 
(so holistically understood that can 
hardly be distinguished from well-
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being). Given the truth of this 
consideration, I assume that biological 
relatedness challenges the experience 
of unhomelikeness due to the fact that 
biological relatedness constitutes a 
(stable over time) background 
promoting closeness and intimacy. I go 
into. 
Human-beings experience a sense of 
vulnerability (in the over-inclusive 
sense of the term) due to the very 
nature of our humanity. This sense of 
vulnerability is an ontological 
challenge that may produce existential 
distress. In part, this relates to their 
perishable human nature and the 
struggle for survival (to which humans 
are intrinsically motivated) in a world 
where human-beings co-exist with 
others in a complex network of 
interdependent relationships, 
interrelations, interactions, or inter-
relational interactions.  Importantly, 
many feminist scholars are of the 
opinion that our self is deeply 
relational and socially embedded, and 
that ‘individual is whole only in a 
world of others’ (Cassel, 1991). 
Oduncu (2003) arguably states that 
human-beings are deficient beings in 
all their dimensions (physical, mental, 
social and cultural). Therefore, human 
beings are depended, fragile, needy 
and (as such) intrinsically vulnerable 
(in the over-inclusive sense of the 
term) beings. Consequently, they have 
to constantly defend their corporeal 
integrity, namely, their (co)existence 
(with others) or -in terms of 
phenomenology- their “being-in-the-
world” (Svenaeus 2012).  In this 
respect, human beings constantly 
defend their health (holistically 
conceived) and wellbeing, namely, in 
terms of phenomenology human 
beings constantly strive to prevent their 
homelike being-in-the-world from 
becoming compromised. 
Phenomenology is “the first-person 
perspective”. Ferguson (2012) puts it 
best in saying it is a “method by which 
an individual engages with, interprets, 
and conceptualizes the world based on 
his own perspective and lived 
experience”. According to the author 
the meaning of this method 
distinguishes phenomenology from 
traditional science. From a 
phenomenological standpoint human 
body is not only a   biological 
organism but also as a “lived body” 
that co-exists with others. According to 
Heidegger any human-being is being-
in-the-world-at-all that co-exists 
mostly with others and understands 
(not only feels) that encounters others 
(Ferguson 2012). As Svenaeus (2013, 
p: 117) states “to live in an 
environment means to interpret it and 
assign it meaning through feelings, 
thoughts and action. Thus, the life-
world of phenomenology is not 
identical to physical surroundings, but 
is a meaning-pattern partly created by 
the person himself.” The state of 
unhomelikeness involves deprivation 
across a range of different dimensions 
so that “an individual engages with, 
interprets, and conceptualizes the 
world based on his own perspective 
and lived experience” (Svenaeus, 
2011) in a not homelike way. Because 
of their sense of vulnerability, human 
beings stay intuitively motivated over 
time to develop supportive (intimate) 
relationships with other human beings 
with whom they co-exist in the world. 
Biological parenthood involves a 
significant amount of existential 
relatedness, namely, relatedness that is 
strictly related to the existence (being-
in-the-world) of a ‘lived’ body, which 
remains stable over time. This kind of 
relatedness is existential (and hence of 
great importance) since it is based on 
the sharing of a significant percentage 
of common genes that govern the body 
(in case of genetic parenthood), or the 
creation of a body and the sharing of 
common self which continued over a 
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period of time in the past (in case of 
gestational motherhood). This kind of 
relatedness constantly gives rise to 
high degree of perceived closeness or 
perceived intimacy between parents 
and offspring, which in turn, challenge 
a potential shift from a homelike to a 
unhomelike being-in-the-world in the 
important dimension of interaction 
with others. In other words, the 
aforementioned perceived intimacy 
keeps the way one interacts with 
(some) others unchanged, namely, 
prevents the lived  body from 
becoming an alien being in relation to 
other lived bodies (those of parents or 
children, respectively).  Taken to 
extremes, I assume that making the 
(intimate) acquaintance of biological 
relatives is enhancing the sense of 
safety and finally the well-being of a 
person. 
Note, however, that social 
constructionism is not completely 
indifferent in biological parenthood. I 
explain why. As regards genetic 
parenthood, it requires a significant 
degree of genetic relatedness, though 
complete genetic similarity undermines 
the establishment of parental 
relationship. On the one hand, it is 
reasonable that minimal degree of 
genetic relatedness does not suffice to 
establish parenthood. This is the case 
with mitochondrial replacement. The 
HFEA has stated that “mitochondria 
donors should have a similar status to 
that of tissue donors” (HFEA 2013).  
On the other hand, it is argued that if 
two people are genetically identical 
(e.g. donor and clone) they share too 
much genetic material for a parental 
relationship to be established between 
each other (Sparrow 2006, p. 315). 
Given that the concept of parenthood 
has been developed over time as 
strictly related to the traditional nuclear 
heterosexual family, the consideration 
that two genetically identical 
individuals share genetic material that 
is too much for a parental relationship, 
in all likelihood is a matter of social 
constructionism. As regards gestational 
motherhood, the gestational co-
existence (at an ontological level) of 
gestational carrier and embryo/fetus is 
most likely to be perceived by the 
woman as a co-existence of ‘two 
human beings in one self’.  Note, 
however, that this is a matter of self-
forming process, which, involves a 
level of social-narrative identity (when 
viewed through the lens of 
phenomenology). Provided that in the 
context of phenomenology it is 
suggested that self has a multilayered 
make-up. The ‘lived body’ forms the 
core of self. The process of selfhood 
starts at a preconscious embodied level 
but the process attains a different 
quality at the conscious levels of self-
reflection and social-narrative identity 
(Svenaeus 2012). Self-forming is an 
infinite endeavor. Interestingly, 
Kolodny (2010) argues that individuals 
show to their selves a special 
(self)concern over time that is based on 
a continuous biological relationship to 
their selves. By the way, this 
assumption is the starting point on 
which Kolodny (2010) builds up his 
(novel) account of genetic partiality in 
defending genetic relatedness.   
 
Is there bio-social parenthood?  The 
answer is yes 
Di Nucci (2016) states that the 
recognition of intrinsic value in 
biological ties between parents and 
children reinforce  (patriarchy) 
prejudices and have as consequences 
unfair parental projects due to unequal 
distribution of roles and 
responsibilities as well as to power 
imbalances.  This is a by and large true 
assumption. However, I challenge the 
unexceptional application of it. 
Therefore, I provide an individual 
account of (early) parenthood. This is 
what I call “bio-psycho-social 
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parenthood”. This novel account of 
parenthood is biologica/social hybrid. 
It can be perceived intuitively as being 
equivalent to forms of parenthood that 
are to a minimal extent biological.  
 Parenthood is a complicated, volatile, 
and (to a lesser or greater degree) 
socially shaped notion. An adequate 
account of parenthood would be 
pluralist, inclusive of both biological 
and social parenthood.  Parenthood has 
been thought of as being arisen from 
various relations between parent and 
children. Interestingly, an inclusive 
account of parenthood was suggested 
by Bayne and Kolers (2003) who state 
that “being causally implicated in the 
creation of a child is the key basis for 
being its parent”, thus granting 
parenthood “to genetic, gestational, 
custodial, and intentional parents”. 
Besides, it is greatly noticeable that 
biological parenthood is already to 
some extent a matter of degree. 
Currently, a woman may minimally 
become involved  in a child’s direct 
genetic derivation, whether by offering 
her mitochondrial DNA in case of 
mitochondrial replacement, or  by 
gestating a donated embryo (or an 
embryo created with a donated oocyte) 
in a uterus transplant. Furthermore, the 
currently available evidence 
concerning experimental IVF 
techniques and fertility treatments are 
expected to afford an array of options 
for achieving parenthood ranging from 
minimal to full biological parenthood. 
As Palacios-Gonzalez et al. (2014) 
state, the developing technique of “in-
vitro generated gametes” (IVG) may 
be a method “allowing multiple 
individuals to engage in genetic 
parenting together, thus blurring the 
distinction between biological and 
social generations”. 
 
I consider a subtle categorical 
distinction between (minimal) 
biological and (particular forms of 
early) social parenthood, taking into 
account the view of the so-called 
“attachment theorists”. The perspective 
I offer here involves the (indeed 
strong) claim that a neonate is a post-
partum fetus running the 
extracorporeal phase of its creation 
until it acquires the ability to make 
aims. In literature has been supported 
the assumption that human creation is 
a process that goes beyond the birth of 
not only preterm but also full-term 
neonates (Wilkinson 2011; Rieder 
2017).  In my view, birth is social 
rather than bio-physiological process 
and goes far beyond the point of 
physical disconnection between fetus 
(newborn) and maternal body.                                                                     
Besides, the capability of making aims 
might be viewed as fundamental 
functional skill for becoming a 
member of society. I consider this 
developmental milestone to be a cut-
off point between only ontologically 
born person (“associate” member of 
society) and fully born (full-member of 
society) person. The making aims 
capability has also been mentioned by 
Giubilini and Minerva (2013) as a cut-
off point.  However, I firmly disagree 
with their (mostly contentious) 
suggestion in support of the so-called 
“post-partum abortion”. Being a post-
partum “fetus does not necessarily 
implicate a drastic decrease in moral 
status. An ontologically born person is 
already an associate member of society 
and hence it deserves (under its 
humanity and dignity) a right to be 
fully protected by our legal and ethical 
system. 
An early caregiver, in addition to 
providing practical support, may invest 
a great deal of their own psycho-
physical energy to meet the newborn’s 
emotional needs, thus causing it to 
develop until up to become capable of 
making aims (and so on). Hence, what 
such a caregiver does might be 
considered equivalent to taking over 
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creating the child, even if the newborn 
is a full-term not only a preterm one as 
it has been suggested in literature very 
recently (Rieder 2017).  It is to be 
stressed that according to the so-called 
“attachment theorists” early newborn-
to-mother   attachment (emotional 
intimacy that begins probably in utero) 
is essential for newborn’s development 
through a range of biopsychosocial 
mechanisms (Dykes et al. 2016). Even 
“relatively small amounts of parent-
infant closeness” may have beneficial 
results for a newborn, especially a 
preterm one (Reynolds et al. 2013). 
Indeed, a primary specific caregiver 
(with parental intention) who is 
responding promptly, lovingly and 
warmly, causes to it to experience 
“organized attachment” (long-term 
interaction, not simply bonding) which 
is a key determinant factor for its later 
lifelong socio-emotional behavior. 
When an early social parent causes to a 
newborn to experience newborn-to-
parent “organized attachment” (Benoit 
2004) by offering her own bio-
psychical energy to it, she becomes 
causally involved in the bio-psycho-
social building of the newborn, thus 
making it for life to be dependent on 
the specific bio-social parent. For 
instance, parental warmness in early 
stages of life seems to make 
neuropeptides as vasopressin to 
enhance for life the child’s pro-social 
attitude motivated by empathy (Tabak 
et al. 2015). Quite obviously, this 
function is based on permanent 
neuroendocrinological micro-
alterations to child’s organism (in all 
likelihood caused by the parental 
warmness emerged from parent as a 
bio-psychical unity), which however 
are of great importance for the 
health/well-being of the child. Given 
the truth of the assumption that the 
“organized attachment” is required to 
start being experienced by the newborn 
at most some hours after birth in order 
to be effective, a social parent rushing 
into a newborn-parent “organized 
attachment” over the period from birth 
to acquiring the ability of making aims 
becomes psycho-bio-social parent as 
becoming causally involved in the 
psycho-bio-social completing of the 
process of the social “birth” of the 
child. 
 
Conclusion 
In the context of modern techno-
science, social reality and theoretical 
thinking one can identify a number of 
arguments that might count as good 
evidence to underscore the biological 
relatedness of offspring. Using 
phenomenology, it is argued that 
people are intrinsically motivated to 
have genetic relatives with as much as 
possible high relatedness coefficient is. 
The desire for genetic relatedness is 
subtly differentiated from the desire for 
genetic parenthood since genetic 
parenthood is shaped by biology and to 
a small extent by society. 
Notwithstanding, gestational 
parenthood is shaped by biology and to 
a great extent by society. Further, in a 
third step, this study moves forward on 
a novel (individual) account of 
parenthood that is a (borderline) 
biological/social hybrid in the case 
where (social) parenthood starts during 
early neonatal period. This account of 
parenthood comes from the heart and 
the parent-newborn attachment and 
occupies the intersection between 
biologic and social parenthood.  Social 
parenthood would be considered not 
purely social when starting at the very 
beginning of child’s life. The 
acceptance of this account of 
parenthood could smooth out the sharp 
categorical distinction between 
biological and social parenthood so 
that the risk of unfairness within 
parental projects (due to biological 
relatedness) might be decreased. 
Hence, the reinforcement of biological 
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parenthood may become far less 
harmful to family relations. 
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